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A transport noise-pricing model is developed, which distinguishes between transport 
sound externalities, real resource costs  of  transport noise externalities  and monetary 
valuations of such costs. It differs from existing approaches (hedonic pricing and 
contingent valuation), which aim at monetary valuations directly. The internalisation of 
transport noise externalities is modelled at the micro-level and allows aggregation across 
a population to any desired extent. A transport noise externality is characterised for every 
individual as a set of maps from the space of (non-marketable) transport sound 
commodities into the set of feasible actions (marketable and non-marketable human 
activities) such that the set of feasible actions is reduced. The concept of real resource 
costs to an individual corresponds to the duration of disturbances of optimally chosen 
human activities and is measured in units of time. Monetary valuations of such costs 
require only positive personal incomes, irrespective of their source. One example is given 
of applying a dominant strategy mechanism (Mookherjee and Reichelstein) to the 
solution of the model, assuming the objective is to select transport service productions 
which maximise economic profit, appropriate noise measurement technology exists to 
allow the identification of transport sound sources, and ‘polluter pays’ legislation exists 
which can be enforced costlessly.  
 
 
INTERNALISATION OF TRANSPORT  NOISE  EXTERNALITIES, DURATION OF ACTIVITY 
DISTURBANCES, INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS, INCOMPLETE MARKETS, SINGLE 
NOISE EVENT METHOD 
                                                 
* An earlier version of the activity disturbance noise-pricing model was presented at the Workshop - 
Economic Assessment of Transport Noise, 7th International Congress on Noise as a Public Health Problem, 
November 1998, Sydney. This paper is an up-dated version of MGSM WP 2004-1, Ernestine M.A. Gross 
  11. INTRODUCTION 
Transport noise (and other community noise) has become an important problem for 
individuals, urban planners, governments, and transport service providers (WHO, 1993; 
Lambert and Vallet, 1994; Gross, 1994; Berglund and Lindvall, 1995, Report by the 
Senate Select Committee on Aircraft Noise in Sydney, 1995; Lambert et al, 1998; 
Schwela, 1998 among others). There is a problem of conflicting interests and this 
problem is expected to increase in the future: Demand for transport services is projected 
to increase but residents in many urban environments would like a reduction in noise 
pollution. Failure to address this problem entails misallocation of resources, either in the 
sense of some individuals gaining while others lose in terms of their personal welfare, or 
in the sense that the aggregate welfare losses due to transport noise outweigh the welfare 
gains from the provision of transport services. There is no ‘market solution’ to this 
problem of conflicting interests because there is no ‘market’ for transport sound. The 
institutional invention of tradeable pollution rights does not solve this problem; a non-
market agent is required to determine the total amount of pollution, including an accepted 
methodology for measurement and costing of pollution levels. The need for economic 
methods to estimate the cost of transport noise for the purpose of project evaluation and 
the efficient ‘internalisation’ of these costs by means of polluter pay policies is 
recognised (eg OECD/ECMT, 1994). It has also been recognised by the scientific 
community, concerned with the physiological effects of noise, particularly long-term 
adverse health effects (ICBEN, 1998). To be useful for private and public sector decision 
makers, who employ financial methods as decision making aids, the economic cost 
estimates need to be expressed in monetary terms. Similarly, ‘polluter pays’ policies 
involve monetary payments.   
  There are two existing economic methods of estimating a monetary value (cost) of 
transport noise, namely hedonic pricing and contingent valuation
1. These methods have a 
common underlying theoretical framework and they share a welfare criterion. They differ 
in the assumption made about the market structure and how much information can be 
inferred from market prices.  
  Hedonic pricing, makes a strong assumption about the structure of markets and 
hence the role of markets in allocating resources efficiently. It assumes asset (real estate) 
market prices completely span the state space of decision variables.
2 The asset prices are 
assumed to reveal individuals’ budget constrained preferences (‘revealed preference 
approach’) and the aim of empirical studies is to impute the cost of transport noise from 
real estate market prices.  (Walter, 1975; Pearce, 1978;  Nelson, 1980;  O’Byrne et al 
1985;  Pennington et al, 1990;  Uyeno et al 1993, Levesque, 1994;  Renew, 1998 among 
others). 
  The alternative economic method, known as contingent valuation, makes an 
equally strong assumption about the role of markets in allocating resources, however at 
the opposite extreme. This method essentially assumes that market prices contain ‘no 
relevant information’. Consequently, attempts are made to estimate the ‘social cost’ of 
                                                 
1 In special circumstances where noise insulation restores the welfare of individuals, the direct cost method 
would also belong to this class of models.  
2 In the specialist area of finance, the Capital Asset Pricing model makes an equivalent spanning 
assumption regarding financial assets (eg Jarrow, 1988)  
  2noise by trying to elicit information about individuals’ preferences directly (‘stated 
preference approach’) within the context of simulated choice situations (Soguel, 1996; 
Weinberger, 1992).  
  Hedonic pricing, developed in the specialist area of transport economics (Walter, 
1975), is the most widely used and accepted economic method. Its apparent appeal is the 
objectivity of data (market prices). However, its applicability is restricted to those cases 
where the ‘complete spanning’ assumption sufficiently closely approximates the actual 
conditions. Empirical researchers do not seem to appreciate the importance of the 
spanning condition (Starret, 1988; see also Kanemoto, 1988). For example, the aircraft 
noise sharing policy, introduced in Sydney and elsewhere, is not consistent with the 
complete spanning condition; in the limit there is not even one house, the price of which 
can reflect the absence of ‘noise’. Similarly, if residential location per se is an element in 
the utility function of an individual (historical value, proximity to friends or place of 
work) then the spanning condition is violated, too. 
 Contingent  valuation  originated in the specialist area of environment and resource 
economics (Davis, 1963; Mitchell and Carson, 1989;  Flatley and Bennett, 1996 among 
others). This method is considered to be controversial and costly (Arrow et al, 1993, 
Lambert et al, 1998).  However, if a local environmental problem is 'big', in the sense that 
its solution would significantly disturb all local market prices, then these prices cannot be 
presumed to contain any relevant information and the contingent valuation approach 
seems to be difficult to avoid.  
  The model presented in this paper assumes market prices do contain relevant 
information but ‘not all of it’. The incompleteness of markets is reflected in the solution 
to the model, which requires market and non-market information. The welfare criterion in 
this model is the same as in the existing methods. However, in contrast to hedonic pricing 
and contingent valuation, which use traditional microeconomic concepts and methods to 
arrive at monetary values directly, the approach taken in this paper is to first characterise 
an efficient internalisation of transport noise externalities in a general equilibrium model, 
assuming ‘price-taking in utility’ (Lindahl equilibrium). Second, a ‘transport noise- 
pricing’ model is developed, the solution of which does not require information on the 
marginal rate of substitution (personalised relative price) between ‘noise’ and a 
numeraire commodity. In this model, a transport noise externality for an individual is 
characterised by maps from the space of non-marketable transport sound commodities 
into an individual’s set of feasible actions (marketable and non-marketable human 
activities) such that the set of possible actions is reduced. In contrast to the existing 
methods, this model separates transport noise externalities into real resource costs 
(duration of disturbance of human activities, measured in units of time) and the monetary 
valuation. The real resource costs are independent of the institutional environment. They 
can be aggregated across individuals by addition. They lend themselves for comparative 
studies across space and time. Monetary values can be made dependent on the 
institutional environment (labour market prices, or administratively determined prices or 
both). A strictly positive money income is sufficient to achieve monetary valuation, 
irrespective of its source.  To avoid cumbersome notation, the transport noise-pricing 
model does not include securities markets, while recognising that such markets would 
provide yet a further possibility for positive incomes other than those provided by labour 
markets or income transfers. The model is presented in minimalist form in section 2. 
  3  The assumption of ‘price-taking in utility’ is a strong one for a model such as the 
present, which is intended to be of practical use, because this assumption excludes 
strategic behaviour. The approach taken to deal with this problem is contained in section 
3 of this paper. It consists of examining the properties of the transport noise-pricing 
model in section 2 from the perspective of implementation theory. One example of 
implementation is considered. On the assumption that there exists an appropriate 
transport noise measurement and reporting technology, and polluter pays legislation (with 
negligible costs) the solution of the noise-pricing model is implementable with a 
dominant strategy mechanism (Mookjerjee and Reichelstein, 1989).   
  Section 4 contains a brief discussion of possible applications of the model, 




2. TRANSPORT NOISE-PRICING MODEL 
Theoretical models of non-dictatorial resource allocation systems take as axiomatically 
given that each individual knows what is ‘best’ for him or her in terms of consumption of 
commodities. This idea is made precise by the concept of preferences (a preordering). A 
commodity is defined in terms of its physical properties, date of availability, location of 
availability. (Taking into account one notion of uncertainty, a state dependent commodity 
is defined as a commodity, which is made available conditional on a ‘state of nature’ 
occurring.
3) The interpretation of a ‘location’ in terms of geographical dimensions and 
the interpretation of a ‘date’ in terms of calendar time depend on the practical problem at 
hand. Quantities of a commodity are measured in appropriate units, eg. grams, miles, 
{amplitude, phase}.  Transport sound satisfies the definition of a commodity. 
 Let    { I  denote the index set of individuals in an urban community. As an 
approximation, all commodities are assumed to be measurable in real numbers. Let 
denote the quantity of commodity  ;   if commodity z is consumed by 
individual  ,   if z is supplied by   and   if neither consumed nor supplied. 
Let  denote an M-dimensional vector of marketable consumption commodities 
(including transport services) and let   denote a strictly positive vector of prices 
for these commodities. Let   denote an L-dimensional vector of marketable labour 
services with prices (wages)  , and let   denote a vector of services, 
which are supplied by   for i’s own consumption. Examples of such services include 
gardening, watching TV, going shopping, sleeping.  These activities are non-marketable 
commodities and therefore there are no market prices. Marketable and non-marketable 
labour services may be referred to as ‘human activities’.   
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 Let  y ∈  denote a vector of transport sound commodities and let 
 denote a production vector (project); input commodities 
are non-positive quantities and output commodities are non-negative quantities. To save 
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3 Debreu (1959) 
  4marketable non-labour commodities, marketable labour, non-marketable labour activities, 
and noise commodities. The representation of transport sound by a finite dimensional 
Euclidean space is an approximation with the following interpretation. To allow for 
different human reactions to noise levels, as measured by say L(max)dB between ‘night’ 
and ‘day’ time, two ‘noise commodities’ are required for each day. Allowing for longer 
time periods or finer partitions of the time unit ‘day’, say hours, as well as other noise 
measures, say L(eq, x hrs), L(eq, y hrs) etc, the number of noise commodities, N, may be very 
large
4.  Noise commodities are non-marketable. 
  Each individual is assumed to have convex and closed preferences. Hence, 
preferences can be represented by smooth real valued utility functions
5, 
.   L e t  u  denote the i
th  individual’s marginal rate of 
substitution (trade-off) for the commodities   at a point 
.  Each individual is assumed to be non-satiated in the 
consumption of marketable commodities and non-marketable human actitivies. To save 
on notation, asset markets are ignored and individuals’ endowments are assumed to 
consist of marketable and non-marketable human activities.  
I i u















  A transport service production is characterised by a production vector, 
.  Transport sound occurs if   for some  .  
N M L
N M L y y y y + − ℜ × ℜ × ℜ ∈ = ) , , ( y h > 0 hN ∈
  Assuming individuals are ‘price takers in utility’, a decentralised solution to the 
problem of transport noise is provided by a Lindahl equilibrium
6. In this case an efficient 
internalisation of the pollution costs means that the polluting transport service provider 
pays for the cost c  where   is the i
th individual’s 
personalised relative price of noise commodity   in terms of a numeraire commodity r.  
Each individual’s transfer ('compensation') is c .  If the polluter pays policy is 
not imposed, then the i
th individual carries a personal cost (‘noise tax’?) equal to c  and 
the financial (commercial) value of project   over-estimates the economic value by an 
amount equal to c .
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  The assumption of ‘price taking in utility’ implies ethical behaviour, which is 
often considered to be at variance with observed behaviour and it is incompatible with the 
assumption of ‘non-satiation’. Individuals may have an incentive to misrepresent their 
preferences to, say increase their transfer payments. The application of non-cooperative 
game theory to design a 'mechanism' to induce individuals to 'truthfully reveal' their 
private information will be discussed in section 3.  At present, the aim is to simplify the 
problem by finding conditions such that the pricing of transport noise commodities does 
not require information on individuals' marginal rates of substitution between 'transport 
noise' and a numeraire commodity.  
 
4Similarly, noise events, which differ regarding their frequency components, but not in terms of noise level, 
would constitute different commodities.  
5 Debreu  (1954) 
6 Lindahl (1967). For applications to environmental problems see Blad and Keiding (1990) 
7 An example of the confusion between economic and financial value of an airport project and its 
consequences is described in Gross (1994). The idea of the model presented here is contained in the same 
paper.  
  5  The elementary time period chosen is a ‘day’, denoted by t. This interpretation of 
a  date seems appropriate in terms of physiological characteristics of humans. It is 
assumed that the market structure is sequential (eg Radner, 1972, Kreps and Wilson, 
1982) and that on any ‘day’ each individual can sell only one type of labour service 
commodity in the market.
8  On each day, each individual decides how to allocate his or 
her real resources (‘time’) between selling labour services for the purpose of ‘making 
money’ to buy ‘goods and services’ and non-marketable human activities.  The set of 
feasible choices of the i
th individual is real resource constrained; the sum of the absolute 
values of the quantities of marketable and non-marketable labour services supplied on 
any one ‘day’, t, is equal to 1. Let 
, } , , 1 1 / / : ) {(
,
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(identical embedding for  and all other commodity sub-spaces), denote i’s real 
resource constrained choice set (ie the set of feasible actions).  Furthermore, each day, t, 
each individual i faces a budget constraint in the market for goods and services, namely  
. The assumption of ‘non-satiation’ yields equality of income 
earned and income spent in the market. It is noted that the budget constraint depends on 
the choice variable  .  
ℜ= ℜ× × ℜ −− −
LL L T 1 L
  To save space and cumbersome notation, only one ‘day’ (T=1) will be considered 
in the following and the subscript t will be dropped. This simplification is innocuous for 
the purpose at hand because the market structure is sequential and intertemporal choices 
are not the subject of analysis.
9 
  Without transport sound, ie. yh h N = ∀ ∈ 0 , individual i decides on an 
allocation, which is ‘best’ in the sense of being most preferred by i (‘utility maximising’) 
and the chosen allocation is budget and real resource feasible.  Let    
denote i
th choice with 
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 Let   denote the marketable labour service, which i can make available at t and 
define all marginal rates of substitution for individual i  with respect to  . (The 
marketable commodity  provides a personalised numeraire commodity.) Individual i’s 
preference maximising choice is characterised by:  (i) The equality of the marginal rates 
of substitution (personalised prices) of the non-marketable human activities and the 
personalised numeraire commodity, ie  ; (ii) The 
equality of the marginal rates of substitution and the prices of consumption goods and 
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  The opportunity cost (market value foregone) of non-marketable human activities 
can be deduced from i’s real resource constraint on human activities.
10 It suffices to 
                                                 
8 As with asset markets, long term labour contracts could be incorporated by introducing more notation but 
without changing the basic structure of the model. 
9 In an applied context, time and location may affect the parameter values. 
10 Some time for sleep per period of time is essential for survival. On the face of it this would suggest that 
the actual hours available for individuals to allocate is less than 24 hours per day. However, if one were to 
  6consider two non-marketable human activities, k and z. The real resource constraint is 
.  The money income from selling an amount  of the marketable 
labour commodity   is  . The feasible choice of non-marketable human 
activities,   , implies that individual i values these activities at least as highly 
as the purchase of marketable commodities, which could be achieved by using the time to 
‘make money’, i.e.  .  
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 Individual  i’s optimal choice is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of one 
marketable consumption good, m, one non-marketable labour service, s, and the 





i , −  indicate the real resource 
constraint. The relative market prices,  , imply a trade-off relationship between m 
and s, ie the implied opportunity cost.  
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The production of transport services creates a negative externality if for at least 
one individual in the urban environment the set of feasible acts is reduced.
11   Examples 
                                                                                                                                                 
follow this approach then the valuation of sleep disturbance due to transport noise would be excluded a 
priori.  
11 The above definition of a negative externality is a straightforward application of the notion of an 
‘externality’ as found in mathematical economics. For example in Blad and Keiding (1990, pp 253-4): “The 
fundamental common feature of all types of externalities is that the acts of one agent affects the set of 
feasible acts of other agents. The result may either be that the other agents obtain a larger set of possible 
  7of transport noise reducing the set of feasible acts for individuals are widely reported; 
sleep disturbances, reduced power of concentration, interference with viewing of 
television, listening to music, and conversations are some examples of activity 
disturbances, which were found to be associated with noise in psycho-acoustic studies  
(eg   Hede  and Bullen, 1982, Gross and Sim, 1997, among many other).   
In the present model, negative transport noise externalities
12 are characterised for 
each individual, i,  as maps from the space of transport sound commodities into the 
individual’s set of feasible actions, 
i N i
z X f → ℜ+ :,   i i I L z ∪ ∈ ∀   all  , such that for 
some   and some   the resulting set of possible choices 
iI ∈
i iI ∈ N h∈ X
~
 is ‘smaller’ than 




i X  strict.   
Let   > 0 denote the quantity of transport sound commodity   associated with 
the production of transport service    and let   
denote the quantity of activity   which by   is no longer a possible choice for 
individual   due to the transport noise event   > 0. Noting the sign convention for 
marketable and non-marketable human activities,  takes values in the closed 

















0 [ h h y y ≤ ≤ 0   (for the purpose of 
economic analysis,  h y  is a technologically given parameter). The transport noise 
externality   is measured in units of time and expressed as a fraction of the 
elementary time interval, called ‘a day’. 
/ ) ( h y /
i
z x
  An external effect is illustrated in Figure 2. In this example   is assumed to be 
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L i i i x x y x ~ ) ( − = . The externality function   depends on the individual and 








                                                                                                                                                 
choices - in this case we speak of a positive external effect - or they experience a reduction in their 
possibilities of choice, a negative external effect”. 
12  There are examples of transport sound creating positive externalities.  A parent tries to calm a screeming 
toddler. The parent hears an approaching plane, points to the sky, the toddler sees the plane and stops 
screeming. The parent’s set of feasible choices has expanded; time used to calm the toddler is now 
available for something else. It seems such positive externalities are quantitatively unimportant.  
13  Individual A may be more ‘noise sensitive’ than individual B with respect to all human activities 
(  all z) or an individual may be may be more ‘noise sensitive’ with respect to activity k 
than z (x ).  The notion of relative ‘noise sensitivity’ in this definition is unrelated to 
preferences.  The notion is rather akin to the observation that some people do not respond well to some type 
of food and they say they ‘can’t eat it even though they like the taste of it’; ie a restriction on the 
consumption technology. Given the definition of a commodity, changes in relative noise sensitivity over 
time can be taken into account.  
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  The transport noise externality   is costless for the individual if  ) ( h
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because the most preferred choice is not disturbed. Let   denote the duration of 
the disturbance of activity z, given the optimally chosen amount of this activity,  . This 
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  The total real resource cost to individual i of the transport sound event  is given 
by  . The total real resource cost of the transport 
sound event   to the ‘community’ i = 1, …, I  is the sum of the costs to the individuals, 
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  The monetary valuation of individual i’s real resource costs of a transport noise 
event,  , is given by  , where   is the price of the labour service sold by i 
at t.   




L x y x p
i i L p
  Assuming not all members of a community derive monetary income from the sale 
of labour services (and there are no asset markets for intertemporal wealth transfers), but 
the social norms of a particular community are such that income transfers (social welfare 
payments) are legislated, then a monetary valuation of individual’s real resource costs of 
a transport noise event is still possible. Let   denote the transfer payment received 
by individual i during period, t (a ‘day’). Keeping all else constant, individuals on income 
support allocate their time among non-marketable human activities. The monetary 
valuation of the duration of disturbances of human activities is given by  .  
0 >
i S p




S x y x p
i
  The foregoing description of the model is minimalist in the sense that only one 
transport sound event has been considered. The aim of section 2 was to bring out the 
distinction between the notion of a transport sound externality, the real resource costs of 
  9such an externality to an individual and to the ‘community’, and its monetary valuations 
under alternative assumptions about the institutional environment by means of applying 
the methodology of general equilibrium theory. The primitives of this theoretical 
framework represent the philosophical stance that the material welfare of individuals is 
central to economic analysis.   
  It is convenient to treat the aggregation of several transport sound events for an 
individual and the disaggregation of transport service production in the following section. 






There is a finite number of transport services producers, j = 1, …, J.  Let J also denote the 
index set for such producers. The internalisation of transport noise externalities requires 
that transport service producer  with production  j ) , ~ (
j
N
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and sound events    pays  , where   
and individual   receives a transfer payment     from transport service 
provider  .  In contrast to the Lindahl equilibrium, the internalisation of transport noise 
externalities does not require information on individuals’ marginal rate of substitutions 
between transport sound commodities and a numeraire commodity.   
N j
N y + ℜ ∈ ) ˆ ;
i x x













j y x p c
i ∑ =
c













 Let  Y ℜ ⊂  denote the total set of technologically possible transport 
service productions for an economy (‘community’)
14, with  being an element in 
 Efficient resource allocation amounts to choosing that transport service technology, 
, which yields the highest economic profit, i.e. 
N M L
+ − ℜ × ℜ ×
∑ = j
j y y
y c y p ≥ −
. Y
y* Y ∈
y c y p − ~ ~ * ~ ~ *  all Y y∈ .  
The first term in the definition of economic profit,  y p~ ~ , corresponds to the commercial or 
‘market value’ of a transport service project
15.  The second term, c , is the total 
monetary value of the transport noise externalities associated with the total transport 
production  y.  The transport noise pricing model of section 2 specifies that 
 for a given 
y




jI i L x y x p
i ∈∈ J ∑∑
y c = Y y∈ . 
                                                 
14 For the present purpose, it is sufficient to make only one assumption on the properties of the total 
production technology, namely that it is technologically possible to have no transport services, ie  .  0 ∈Y
15 In an applied context project   may differ from project   in terms of the type of transport 
infrastructure (air, water, rail, road) or in terms of the utilisation of an infrastructure type (eg light aircraft 
versus heavy aircraft, time of the day of operation, flight paths modes, etc) or in terms of geographical 
locations, or in terms of construction methods (different road surfaces). Trade-off decision problems 
between noise externalities and construction methods or operating modes amount to comparing the 
economic profits of alternative projects. Similarly, ‘abandonment decisions’ involve comparing the 
economic profits of existing versus alternative transport infrastructure or alternative utilisations. For some 
transport noise problems (eg aircraft, infrequent trucks, motor cycles), single noise events can be used to 
describe differences in transport service technologies. The single noise event technology seems to be 
particularly suitable for applying the model described in this paper 
' y y
  10    While all variables in the solution to the model of section 2 are measurable, the 
empirical measurement raises familiar methodological problems in research that involves 
human subjects. Laboratory studies offer control over at least some conditions. However, 
these methods may be intrusive, inducing behaviour changes. Alternatively, field studies, 
which rely on asking people to report the duration of activity disturbances (and state their 
personal incomes), are subject to the problem of strategic behaviour. In particular, non-
satiated individuals have an incentive to overstate the duration and opportunity cost of 
activity disturbances in order to increase their wealth
16.  On the other hand, private 
owners or operators of transport infrastructure, whose objective it is to maximise 
shareholders’ monetary returns (ie commercial profits), or managers whose bonuses 
depend on the monetary returns have an incentive to minimise the transfer payments to 
noise affected residents by, say, under-reporting transport service productions.  There is a 
conflict of interest problem and all agents have an incentive to misrepresent their private 
information.   
  The objective of internalisation of transport noise externalities, as described 
above, belongs to a class of planning problem (‘economic engineering’), which is 
addressed in the theory of implementation.  The aim of this theory is to design game 
forms (called ‘mechanisms’) such that the equilibria satisfy socially desirable properties 
but which do not require vast amounts of knowledge by the planning authority. The ‘rules 
of the game’ should be such that the social arrangements are self-policing. The designer 
of the mechanism should only have to make sure that all ‘players’ respect the ‘rules of the 
game’. This may entail enforcement of the rules by means of monetary or non-monetary 
fines.  
  The design of a mechanism requires the selection of a suitable solution concept, 
given the information structure of the game form
17. A social objective (such as the 
efficient resource allocation with the internalisation of transport noise externalities) is 
said to be implementable with respect to the chosen solution concept. Since the 
pioneering work by Clarke (1971), Mirrlees (1971), Groves (1973), Groves and Ledyard 
(1977), implementation theory has developed rapidly, both in terms of basic research (eg 
necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation with respect to various solution 
concepts
18, the efficiency
19 and dynamic properties
20 of alternative mechanisms) and in 
specialist areas such as voting mechanisms, incentive compatible contracts, and the 
allocation of public goods.
21    
  Assuming an appropriate and agreed upon transport sound measurement 
technology exists and it is recognised in ‘polluter pays’ legislation and the enforcement 
costs are negligible then the dimensionality of the planner’s decision (the choice of  ) 
can be reduced from M+L+N to one (ie,
y*
ℜ ∈ c ). For any given total transport noise 
                                                 
16 Whether people are as ‘greedy’ as assumed in general equilibrium models of competitive economies and 
in non-cooperative game theory is an unresolved empirical question.  
17 ie complete or incomplete information 
18 see Maskin (1977), Maskin (1985),  Repullo (1987) on Nash equilibria.  Moore and Repullo (1989) on 
subgame perfect implementation.  Abreu and Matsushima (1992) on virtual implementation in iteratively 
undominated strategies, Abreu and Matsushima on exact implementation of iteratively weakly 
undominated strategies.  Fudenberg and Tirole (1996) on Bayesian implementation. 
19 eg Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1989), Laffont and Tirole (1987) 
20 eg Cabrales (1999) 
21 see Myerson (1991),  Corchón (1996) 
  11externality cost, c, the decision about the commercial part of transport service production, 
y ~ , can be decentralised, using market prices. The disaggregation of a total noise 
externality cost to the individual producers depends on the accuracy of the transport 
sound measurement technology in distinguishing between different transport noise 
sources. For the purpose of the present discussion, the technology is assumed to be 
sufficient. The problem reduces to finding a mechanism to induce consumers to 






  The solution to the model in section 2 satisfies the conditions provided by 
Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1989) for a class of models in which dominant-strategy 
implementation involves no welfare loss for the planner relative to Bayesian 
implementation.
22  A dominant-strategy mechanism has the property of inducing each 
player to announce his type (‘tell the truth’) independently of the announcements of the 
other players.  Mookherjee and Reichelstein assume that each individual   has 
a quasi-linear utility function, u , where 
iI =1,, L
i i i i i k x V k x + = ) , ( ) , , ( θ θ θ  is a ‘state variable’ 
(ie agent type) and   is the transfer to agent i.  They allow 
i k x to be multi-dimensional, 
but require V to depend on x only through a one-dimensional statistic 
. Furthermore, they assume that agent 
types are independently distributed on a closed interval of agent types, 
i
i u
i i i i k x h + ) ), ( ( θ
i V x = ) , ( that such ) θ k x,
] ,θ θ [ , and the 
distribution of the i
th type satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition
23, and preferences 
satisfy the sorting assumption
24.  
  The interpretation of the transport noise model in section 2 in terms of 
Mookherjee and Reichelstein’s conditions is straightforward. Let   be a 
M+L+I dimensional consumption of marketable commodities and marketable and non-
marketable human activities, as defined in section 2. The state variable (agent type) is the 
maps ( ) .  Assume for each individual i,  is continues and non-decreasing in h, all 
.  Let  , i.e. the duration of the disturbances 
of optimally chosen human activities due to transport noise externalities
25. Define  
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one-dimensional statistic.   
) (x h
i
  For the purpose of real resource costs, all agent types are in the closed interval 
[0,1].  For the purpose of monetary valuation based on labour market prices, all agent 
types are an element in the closed interval  ] , [
i i L L p p . The assumption of an independent 
distribution of agent types does not seem to be a strong one in this context.   
                                                 















d   
24  .  They also assume that    0 / ≥ ∂ ∂ ∂
i i i h V θ 0 /
2 ≥ ∂ ∂ ∂
i i
i h V θ
25 as defined for one sound commodity, h, in section 2. 
  12  The definition of the incentive compatibility constraint in dominant strategy (and 
Bayesian) implementation requires only that the utility derived from revealing the ‘true 
agent type’ is at least as great as the utility of the pay-off derived from revealing any 
other type
26. It is assumed that when individuals are indifferent between the pay-offs 
obtained from the announcement of different types they will announce their ‘true type’. 
In the above mechanism, individuals cannot improve on their pay-off by announcing any 




The model provides an alternative approach to existing economic methods of assigning a 
value (cost) to transport noise. In contrast to hedonic pricing and contingent valuation the 
present model distinguishes between transport sound externalities, the real resource 
costs of transport noise externalities and  monetary valuations of such costs. The 
internalisation of transport noise externalities is modelled at the micro-level and allows 
aggregation across a population to any desired extent. One example of applying a 
dominant strategy mechanism (Mookherjee and Reichelstein) to the solution of the model 
is given, assuming the objective is to select transport service productions which maximise 
economic profit, appropriate noise measurement technology exists to allow the 
identification of transport sound sources, and ‘polluter pays’ legislation exists which can 
be enforced costlessly.  
  The transport noise-pricing model is a one period-one location model. An 
extension to several periods would make the introduction of asset markets as a source of 
intertemporal income transfers meaningful but not interesting because the solution to the 
model requires only that every individual have a positive monetary income in each 
period, irrespective of its source.  However, the possibility of long-term transport noise 
exposure affecting individuals’ sets of feasible choices of marketable and non-marketable 
human activities cumulatively (say a deterioration of health or physical wellbeing in a 
more general sense) calls for care in empirical applications of the one period model.  
  The definition of the theoretical concept the real resource cost to an individual 
corresponds to the common language expression, ‘duration of disturbances of what I 
wanted to do’
27.  Activity disturbance has been found to be a significant scale variable in 
the psycho-acoustic literature. However, the psychology-based methods do not take the 
duration of activity disturbances into account. The model allows disaggregation of human 
activities to any desired number of categories as long as the total time used for the 
activities is no more than 24 hours per day.  This feature of the model, cumbersome as it 
                                                 
26 Using the notation from the above description of Mookherjee and Reichelstein’s work, as found in 
Feudenberg and Tirole (1996, pp 270-71), a dominant strategy mechanism is a function  ) (θ y such that, for 
each agent i = 1, …, I, and for each  , Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility requires  i i i − θ θ θ   and , ˆ ,
) ), , ˆ ( ( ) ), , ( ( i i i i i i i i y u y u θ θ θ θ θ θ − − ≥ . 
27 An exploratory study, carried out in conjunction with a standard psycho-acoustic survey instrument 
showed that the notion of ‘duration of disturbances of human activities’ is meaningful to residents (Gross 
and Sim, 1998) 
  13may be in terms of notation, is deliberate because empirical research in the psycho-
acoustic literature indicates that the reaction of humans to noise differs across activities.  
  The real resource cost measure is independent of the institutional environment in 
an economy. This is a desirable feature. Monetary economies tend to have periods of 
inflation and deflation - some countries more so than others - and at times there are real 
estate market bubbles and the relative values of national currencies fluctuate. While these 
monetary phenomena do not create additional problems for the internalisation of 
transport noise externalities at the time when transport infrastructure projects are 
evaluated, they do introduce arbitrariness into the data for all other purposes. For 
example, comparison of data over time or space is difficult. Furthermore, monetary 
values based on labour market data makes the valuation of transport noise costs 
dependent on the income distribution, which may differ across locations within a country 
and between countries. Some societies may agree that some activities (eg sleep) are 
equally important for all its members and the duration of disturbances of these activities 
should have the same monetary value, irrespective of the individuals' ability to earn 
money in the labour markets. In such cases, administratively determined prices may be 
used to value the real resource cost.
28  Finally, data on the duration of the disturbance of 
various types of human activities may be more meaningful to legislators than monetary 
aggregates. 
  At present aircraft noise assessment methods are methodologically incompatible 
with methods used to allow for transport noise costs in transport infrastructure project 
evaluation. The former uses psycho-acoustic data while the latter uses monetary values 
obtained from economic methods such as hedonic pricing or direct costs. The present 
model provides a unified economics based framework. The real resource cost is measured 
in units of time, which may be expected to correlate better with acoustic data than scale 
variables. The present model lends itself to the application of single noise event data. 
  Implementation theory may also be applied to contingent valuation. However, the 
present noise-pricing model has advantageous features. Firstly, as outlined in section 3, 
the solution to the model is compatible with one-dimensional mechanisms. This is 
desirable because there is a greater choice of mechanisms. Furthermore, for some one-
dimensional mechanisms the minimum number of players is quite small (eg 3 in the case 
of Abreu and Matsushima’s mechanisms). Second, an empirical application of the 
concept of real resource costs of transport noise externalities requires data on individuals’ 
planned activities (a ‘time budget’) and concurrent observations on transport noise events 
and the duration of disturbances of the planned activities. In contrast to contingent 
valuation, there are no hypothetical choice situations involved. The data may be assumed 
to be meaningful not only to economists but also to the general public. Furthermore, 
plausibility checks can be made about monetary valuations by just about anybody who 
has access to income data. The simplicity and transparency of the data requirements may 
make a method based on the present model less controversial than contingent valuation. 
                                                 
28 Administered prices have been used to value positive externalities of transport.  For example, 'travel time 
saved' is valued by means of administratively determined prices in the evaluation of road infrastructure 
projects in New South Wales, Australia (see the Road and Traffic Authority NSW Economic Manual, 
1996) However, the theoretical justification for this method is obscure. The proposed method is a natural 
complement to the valuation of positive externalities, which would remove a possible bias in favour of road 
construction. 
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